With the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan there has been a flurry of questions about the political trajectory of global terrorism.

Recent estimates indicate that there are at least 10,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, including 1,500 to 2,000 members of the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Isis) terror group called Islamic State Khorasan (ISK).

There are another 200 to 500 Al Qaeda members in South Asia.

There have been legitimate concerns that the Taliban’s rise to power may, in some way or another, provide space for the resurgence of jihadi terrorism and lead to an uptick in global jihadi militancy.

Given Isis’ territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq, and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the fear is that jihadis and foreign fighters could now be inspired to take their fight to Afghanistan.

There is already a precedent for this in Southeast Asia.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Southeast Asian Islamist militants sought training and networking with other terror networks based in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war before returning to the region to embark on a cycle of jihadist mayhem.

However, such concerns of a rise in global and regional terrorism overlook a number of factors.

First, the takeover by the Taliban comes amid a highly fractious militant landscape that has seen in-fighting and defections among and within the various militant groups in Afghanistan.

This means the militants could focus their energies inwards rather than on targeting the “far-enemy”.

Secondly, the local nature of jihadi conflicts in the other parts of the world might be an obstacle for groups like ISK to gain traction beyond its so-called “Khorasan” Wilayat (province).

Moreover, Afghanistan’s appeal as a theatre for jihadist conflict may be offset by the presence of other active conflict zones, such as the Sahel and Africa.

In the Southeast Asian context, Indonesian jihadi groups are split into two camps: Pro-Isis and Al Qaeda loyalists.

Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its networks such as the Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS) have congratulated the Taliban on its victory.

However, such expressions do not mean outright support unless there are official directions from Isis and its affiliates as well as credible channels for facilitating their operations, be it for carrying out attacks in the country or for undertaking hijrah (migration) to Afghanistan.

Still, the possibility that this may materialise cannot be ruled out as, in the past, Isis’ calls for hijrah to southern Philippines and Afghanistan have spurred a handful of Southeast Asians to travel to these places.

In mid-2016 and 2017, Isis, through its propaganda videos, had called for the migration of Southeast Asian fighters based in Syria to the southern Philippines.

In June 2017, at the height of the Marawi siege, the Indonesian defence minister stated that the authorities detected around 40 Indonesians in the Philippines.

Thirdly, the international community — including major powers such as China and Russia — are engaging the Taliban while keeping a closer eye on Afghanistan.

While the United States has withdrawn its counterterrorism forces on the ground, it continues to maintain intelligence operations to prevent the region from becoming a terrorist safe haven.

Thus, the reality is that while the jihadi terrorist threat remains, it is more diffused.

Furthermore, unlike the pre-9/11 era, advanced systems of surveillance now have the capability to intercept jihadist militant operations.

Unlike in the past, it may be more difficult now for those in Southeast Asia seeking to undertake hijrah to reach Afghanistan.

SUBTLE MAINSTREAMING OF EXTREMIST IDEALS?

The strategic sagacity of the Taliban’s more prudent, gradualist approach would supposedly appeal to Southeast Asian jihadis militants, particularly among Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate JI networks.

JI leaders in Indonesia, Malaysia and in the Philippines may especially feel validated that their equally low-key gradualist strategy of eroding the foundations of moderate Islam while building up its armed strength in the background would prove the most efficacious route to the establishment of an Islamist State.

In the JI case, this has involved discreetly building up the ideological, material and operational capacity of its base as well as expanding co-operation with non-violent but conservative Islamist interest groups and political parties.

Afghanistan’s appeal to pro-Isis Southeast Asian supporters might stem from a belief in the notion that they are obligated to wage jihad against perceived apostates, in this case the Taliban.

This perception has its basis in a fundamental conflict between Isis’ vision — which is aimed at the creation of a global caliphate — and one that is fundamentally opposed to the Taliban’s goal of fostering the establishment of an Islamic emirate based on national boundaries.

In the August 18, 2021 issue of the Isis-affiliated newspaper, Al-Naba, Isis attacked the Taliban's rise to power as being "enabled by the US".

Rather than undertaking hijrah, the existing threat from Isis-inspired militants in Southeast Asia would more likely stem from terrorist attacks in the region.

Such capabilities are evinced in the August 24, 2020 suicide bombing in Jolo in the Philippines involving female attackers from the Isis-aligned Sawadjaan faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group, which killed at least 14 and wounded 75.

The narrative of the Taliban’s victory could also serve as a source for self-radicalisation in secular societies like Singapore.

Local Muslim rebel groups in the region, including those not allied with Al Qaeda or Isis in the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar, could also elevate their struggles by drawing inspiration from the narrative of victory over Western imperialists in the Muslim world.

A potential scenario which could see recent counterterrorism efforts undermined stems from the normalisation of Islamist extremist ideals into mainstream discourses.

While the Taliban’s promises to deliver a form of inclusive governance have been met with scepticism within the international community, some Indonesian political leaders and Islamic elites have expressed their sympathy towards the Taliban and have already spoken about reaching out to the Taliban.

With pro-Isis elements mostly against the Taliban, and pro-Al Qaeda militants lacking the operational capabilities to undertake armed jihad, the concern is that it is the Islamist parties, not necessarily violent groups, that may increase the appeal of Afghanistan for Southeast Asians.

In the longer-term, this may lead to a closer alignment between the jihadists in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

In Malaysia, Islamist political party Parti Islam Se-Malaysia took to Twitter to congratulate the Taliban on its victory, but later removed the post. In Islamic countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, there could be a subtle mainstreaming of Islamist extremist ideals into the national discourse.

Lastly, Indonesian ideologues could use closed-door study sessions to further elevate Afghanistan’s ideological appeal as a destination for hijrah.

The bottom line is that while the developments in Afghanistan currently do not pose a direct and immediate threat to the jihadist militant landscape in Southeast Asia, the gradual mainstreaming of the narrative of Taliban victory may well be worth closer monitoring.

If left unchecked, this may elevate the appeal of Afghanistan as a destination for hijrah for foreign fighters in Southeast Asia, with subsequent violent consequences for the region, just as what happened in the 1980s and 1990s.

The region would not want to see a repeat of history.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:

Stefanie Kam Li Yee is a research associate at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Kumar Ramakrishna is an associate dean for policy studies, head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and research adviser to the National Security Studies Programme at the same school.