In his inaugural speech on Oct 20, 2014, Indonesia’s President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo proudly declared: “For far too long have we (as a nation) turned our back on our ocean, our seas, our coves and our straits. It is time we restore our glorious place as a maritime nation. Jalesveva Jayamahe (Sanskrit for ‘In the sea we will triumph’).”

Thus President Jokowi’s vision to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) was born amid great national fanfare. Broadly, this would involve building infrastructure to boost the marine-based economy which includes the fishery and shipping industries, as well as strengthening the navy as a maritime power.

Now, five years on and with the president starting a fresh term in office, the fanfare for the GMF has largely died down. 

During his re-election campaign this year, the GMF did not get a mention in Mr Widodo’s manifesto or his victory speech. Nor was it featured in the televised presidential debates. How and why has a doctrine which proved popular with the Indonesian electorate floundered and ended up as an afterthought?

Like many lofty-sounding policies in Indonesia, the GMF was never truly costed. Nor was there any evidence that the president’s campaign team carried out a rigorous feasibility study.  It clearly eluded most people how big a task it would be to bring about the GMF.  

To establish Indonesia as a formidable maritime power, the Navy (TNI-AL) would need a comprehensive revamp. For a start, Indonesia would have to cast aside its decades-old defence doctrine which puts the army above the other two forces, in favour of a more strategic role for TNI-AL. Accelerated modernisation of TNI-AL’s hardware and capabilities would also be required.

But neither has taken place under President Jokowi. Indonesia’s military modernisation trajectory still follows the blueprint formulated in 2012 under former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, known as the Minimum Essential Force.

It envisions that by 2024, Indonesia will have a green-water navy, fully competent to operate in the country’s littoral zones and capable of undertaking missions in the surrounding oceans, but with limited capacity to project its force into distant waters.

While military spending under Mr Widodo has gone up by around 25 per cent, this went largely to higher salaries and logistics rather than military hardware procurements.

Recent upgrades to TNI-AL include three new submarines, but it is unlikely that the MEF targets would have been reached by 2024.

Despite the GMF rhetoric — and the borrowing of TNI-AL’s motto Jalesveva Jayamahe — the Navy has remained in the backseat, as President Jokowi’s predilection for the army has become markedly evident. 

In replacing the outgoing Indonesian armed forces commander Moeldoko in 2015, the president picked the Army Chief of Staff Gatot Nurmantyo. This went against a 2004 law which prescribes rotating the post between the three forces, as Moeldoko had also come from the army.

To be sure, the Jokowi administration did launch several initiatives related to the GMF. Shortly after he first took power, Mr Widodo revived the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, last known to exist back in 1955.

Then in February 2017, he signed a presidential decree on the Indonesian Ocean Policy, which was supposed to guide the realisation of the GMF.

Unfortunately, the blueprint was hazy and failed to bring about a coherent implementation of the vision.

Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Pandjaitan, for example, was often embroiled in a tug-of-war with the popular Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fishery Susi Pudjiastuti over a number of issues, notably the latter’s insistence on continuing to blow up foreign vessels impounded for illegal fishing in Indonesian waters.  

Evan Laksmana, a researcher with Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies, argued that the lack of “a single authoritative agency” to unify the dozens of ministries and government agencies tending to Indonesia’s maritime issues, had resulted in confusion over the implementation of the GMF.

Since Mr Widodo first announced the GMF, Indonesia has built at least 19 new sea ports, with eight more expected to be completed this year. While this may sound impressive, the government’s emphasis continues to be land-based infrastructure projects. Out of the ongoing 37 priority projects, only four are on maritime infrastructure.

The economic benefits of the new ports have not become manifest as both local government red tape and the lack of connecting roads from the ports to local economic areas mean that the new ports will remain underused.  

Another vaunted programme under the GMF was a “maritime highway” goods transportation scheme known as “Tol Laut”, aimed at reducing the great price disparity of goods between the western and eastern parts of Indonesia.

Tol Laut requires heavy subsidies from the government since fully loaded cargo ships often return with barely anything due to the low economic activities in the country’s remote areas. Additionally, it has so far failed in tackling price disparity. Mr Pandjaitan has admitted as much, blaming business monopoly by the national liner PT Pelni and cartelism. 

As the implementation of the GMF runs into obstacles, President Jokowi’s own vision for Indonesia seems to have changed as well over the years. 

His maritime rhetoric largely vanished, his focus has become gradually insular, best reflected in his choosing as the site for the country’s future capital city a place located inland on Borneo, with no direct access to the sea.

Aptly described by the Washington Post as a “jungle city”, the new capital is definitely an odd choice for a nation aspiring to bring back its past maritime glories.

Sriwijaya, the 7th century maritime kingdom encompassing most of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, had its capital in what is now the city of Palembang. While not exactly on the coast, Palembang has direct access to the sea through the great Musi River.  

The late celebrated Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer reasoned that maritime culture started to die its slow death in the archipelago after Javanese Mataram kings, fearing plunder by European colonial fleets which straddled the seas from the 16th century onwards, moved their capitals from the coast into the hinterland.

All things considered, the GMF looks set to remain on the shelf for Indonesia. In his speech at his second inauguration on Oct 20, Jokowi did not mention the GMF even once, saying he would continue to prioritise infrastructure in his first term, the development of human resources and streamlining bureaucracy.

The GMF, while obviously an effective catchphrase in Mr Widodo’s first speech as president, has run into difficulties because it was a half-baked initiative to begin with, designed to appeal to sentimentality rather than common sense.

In his 2019 inauguration speech, the president opted for a new dream, that by 2045 Indonesia will have become a developed nation with an per capita income of around US$23,000 and near zero poverty. 

It remains unclear whether the Indonesia President Jokowi envisages in 2045 will still be a maritime nation.  

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Johannes Nugroho is a writer and political analyst from Surabaya whose commentaries have appeared in the Jakarta Post and Jakarta Globe since the 1990s.