Mr Muhyiddin Yassin has been sworn in as the eighth Prime Minister of Malaysia by the King, concluding the political coup that led to the collapse of Pakatan Harapan (PH) on Feb 24.

While PM Muhyiddin’s coalition, Perikatan Nasional (PN), seeks to consolidate its reportedly small and uncertain majority, PH will try to rally the public and mount a comeback. This will be a challenge, given the problems that led to PH’s collapse.    

PH’s first problem was that it had fulfilled its broadest purpose on Day One after the general election (GE14) on May 9 2018: Remove then PM Najib Razak from power, because United Malays National Organisation (Umno) would not dislodge him from within.

This was what had united PH’s voters, allies and parties viz Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, Parti Warisan Sabah, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah Negara. 

After GE14, the public appeared satisfied not to see Najib and his wife Rosmah Mansor dominating the national stage. Malaysians became less engaged with the ongoing prosecution of Najib for alleged criminal breach of trust and abuse of power in the 1MDB case.

Secondly, while all attention was on when and whether PM Mahathir Mohamad would hand over the premiership to PKR president Anwar Ibrahim as promised, PH’s greater existential threat was that Bersatu president Muhyiddin and PKR deputy president and Economic Affairs Minister Azmin Ali had little to gain with Mr Anwar as PM. 

Once they took their supporters with them, PH would fall. Not much attention was paid to them as the assumption was that Dr Mahathir had full control over them.

Thirdly, and fatally, PH apparently failed to persuade the political establishment, civil service, and general public that it was on the trajectory to win and entrench itself in the next GE.

A recent Merdeka Centre poll showed that 61 per cent of respondents felt the country was heading in the wrong direction. 62.8 per cent of Malays, 59.5 per cent of Chinese and 59.4 per cent of Indians were worried about the country’s economy.

Malay acceptance of PH began to crumble within six months of its coming to power after a successful campaign by the opposition to characterise PH’s move to ratify the International Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, and subsequently the Rome Statute, as an attack on Malay interests.

The alleged dominance of Chinese-majority DAP in the PH administration triggered further anxiety among some Malays, many of whom grew up believing that the DAP is a Chinese chauvinist party. 

At the same time, PH’s pro-reform supporters were frustrated with its slow progress and initiatives like the introduction of khat (Malay-Arabic calligraphy) in the school syllabus. 

This began to have political ramifications with PH’s nearly uninterrupted slew of five by-election losses, in the Malay-majority seats of Semenyih (Selangor) and Rantau (Negri Sembilan), racially mixed Cameron Highlands (Pahang) and Tanjung Piai (Johor), and most recently in Kimanis (Sabah), a Muslim-Bumiputra majority seat. 

PH leaders’ public complaints of a “deep state” reflect their genuine frustration but likely served to encourage it and undermine public confidence in PH’s ability to govern effectively. 

“Deep state” here primarily refers to certain public servants collaborating to resist and thwart the policies of their new political masters. Resolution usually requires persuasion, reassignments, and the stamping of persistent authority over time.  

No Malaysian prime minister has been able to govern effectively and freely without commanding the confidence of the majority of the Malays.  

Only with this can he or she implement significant policies for institutional reform, economic transformation, and to promote multiracial harmony and social justice. 

Former Prime Ministers Abdullah Badawi’s and Najib’s declining support among their Malay base was a major factor in their inability to pursue their preferred policies and eventual loss of power. 

Even the widely respected Dr Mahathir in his second term reportedly felt the hurt of Malay diffidence in him, which was partly attributed to his alliance with DAP. 

Mr Anwar is not believed to have broad Malay support. His party, PKR, is primarily an urban party that relies on support from urban Malays and non-Malays. 

Mr Anwar’s regular calls for a “needs-based affirmative action” also raise anxiety among some Malays that it will replace the race-based pro-Bumiputra affirmative action, particularly when little detail for such a critical and sensitive policy pronouncement has been proffered.

By most estimates, there are about 120 Malay-dominant parliamentary constituencies on the peninsula, out of a total of 222 seats. 

Malays are not a monolithic group. But Umno and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) command the majority of Malay support in Malaysia today, suggesting that the majority is still conservative on Malay privileges and religious matters. 

This includes Malays of all classes and education levels, and across all regions. 

There is, of course, Malay support for PH, primarily in the urban areas.  While they are in the minority, they are often educated, confident, socially mobile, and have an outsized representation in mainstream public discourse.

CONTROLLING THE NARRATIVE

PH’s collapse was reportedly triggered by Mr Muhyiddin who worked with Mr Azmin to form a new coalition with Umno, PAS and others in the opposition.  

This Malay-dominant re-alignment had been anticipated for months among Malaysia’s chattering class, but with the important assumption of Dr Mahathir as its leader. 

While Dr Mahathir does not appear to be the prime mover of the political coup, his apparent reluctance to hand over to Mr Anwar and cultivation of Mr Azmin, Mr Anwar’s rival, had contributed to a tentative atmosphere that encourages desperate power grabs.  

More importantly, Mr Anwar simply did not have the numbers to make good his claim to premiership.  

This is also why Umno and PAS had publicly supported Dr Mahathir as PM for the full term – to undermine Mr Anwar and PH.

This charged environment was compounded by a perceived dominance of non-Malays over policymaking in PH.  

It began with the appointment of non-Malays to important positions like the Finance Minister and Attorney General. 

The vocal Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng was not balanced off by the more subdued Economic Affairs Minister Azmin, who was spearheading the government’s Shared Prosperity Vision 2030, the government’s set-piece economic initiative which offered opportunities for the government to assist lower income Malaysians, including Malays. 

Popular historian Yuval Noah Harari has observed that homo sapiens had climbed to the top of the food chain and built cities and empires due to our ability to create fiction.  

“Large members of strangers can cooperate successfully by believing in common myths.” Stories underwrite religion, politics and community.    

PH lost control of the dominant narrative early on and never recovered. It appeared shell-shocked that it could be accused of being a Chinese-dominated government.

In PH, Malay leaders held almost all the high-profile portfolios: PM Mahathir, DPM Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Home Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu, Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, and Youth and Sports Minister Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman. 

However, they do not project strong race identification, as Umno leaders are wont to do.        

The PH government had sought to fulfil its reform agenda, introducing reforms and reviewing policies in key areas such as the judiciary and criminal prosecution, economy, foreign affairs, and defence.   

The Covid-19 outbreak was well-handled. It had begun to win international investor confidence and improve Malaysia’s fiscal and macroeconomic position amidst global headwinds. 

PH surely hoped to share these fruits with the electorate before the next election. It knew that voters still felt the sting of rising costs of living. 

Ironically, some of PH’s reform efforts were discomfiting and more than what some of their members and voters expected.  

In the coming days, attempts by PH to persuade more MPs to join its column, as with its previous efforts to govern, will come up against the perception of its poor prospects in the next general election.   

Two weeks before the political coup, on my Grab ride from the Kuala Lumpur International Airport to the hotel, I had asked the driver how things were in “Malaysia Baru”. 

He was a well-spoken and tech-savvy man in his late 20s, out ferrying tourists and working hard despite growing concerns over the spread of Covid-19. 

I expected him to lament the resulting subdued business climate. He was reticent, but stated that race relations had worsened, adding, with a pause: “They are attacking Islam.” 

Stories that pit tribe against tribe are powerful.  No society and polity is immune to them.

PH could have overcome most of its teething problems over time. But the idea of PH as a one-term government took hold early and the clock ran out on the pact suddenly.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Ariel Tan is Deputy Head of Policy Studies and Coordinator of the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.