Indonesia militant Bahrumsyah has emerged as a key jihadi leader among Islamic State (IS) supporters in the region, with the demise of several operational commanders of the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) (such as Azahari Husin and Noordin Top), and the capture and incarceration of several others like Hambali, the West Java jihadi who masterminded several JI attacks in Indonesia, including the first Bali bombings.

Bahrumsyah, however, remained under the radar of the security apparatus until he made his appearance in Syria in 2014 as the key commander of the Malay-speaking South-east Asian jihadists affiliated with IS. Bahrumsyah was born in Bogor, West Java, in 1984. He is believed to have spent time in Pamulang, Central Java, as part of his jihadi training. His nom de guerre — Abu Muhammad al-Indonesiy, was a name taken from his son.

Bahrumsyah has three wives and four children. One of his wives is the widow of a jihadist shot dead by Densus 88, the counter-terrorism Special Detachment of the Indonesian Police Force. Bahrumsyah studied at the Universitas Islam Negri Syarif Hidayatullah (State Islamic University) in Ciputat, South Jakarta, in 2004.

He was enrolled in the Department of Communications and Islamic Broadcast at the Faculty for the Proselytization (Propagation) of Islam but dropped out after three semesters. He was known to be bright, hardworking and adept in mobilising students. According to the vice-dean of the faculty, Mr Sunandarnoto Abdul Hakim, Bahrumsyah appeared very religious as he displayed strong Islamic attributes and was dressed in Islamic garb.

Bahrumsyah was also an expert in martial arts, including silat and kung fu. Little is known about Bahrumsyaah after he left Universitas Islam in 2005.

Overall, while his religiosity was well recognised, his radicalism was not. There is no concrete information regarding whether he was a member or supporter of JI. However, he is believed to be a close follower of both Ustad Aman Abdurrahman, a former key JI member, and Abu Bakar Bashir, the former JI spiritual leader.

It is clear though that Bahrumsyah became a follower of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the radical group set up by Abu Bakar Bashir following his split with the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).

Bahrumsyah’s mentor, Ustad Aman, was also a key leader of JAT. Bahrumsyah first came to public prominence in 2014 when he participated in a demonstration with other leading radicals in front of Hotel Indonesia in Jakarta where they declared their support and allegiance to the then Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Isis). Following the demonstration, Bahrumsyah joined others in holding public gatherings in support of Isis.

On April 25, 2014, Bahrumsyah, in close association with the Salafi groups based in the West Java city of Bekasi (adjacent to Jakarta) led by Syamsudin Uba, made an attempt to influence a gathering at the Masjid Muhammad Ramadhan that had just been taken over by the moderate local Bekasi administration.

At the first Friday prayers, Uba invited Bahrumsyah to deliver the khutbah (sermon), but he was unable to do so due to objections from the mosque administration. Another incident occurred at Masjid Muhajirun, a nearby mosque south of Bekasi, when Uba, Bahrumsyah and his supporters staged a mass walkout.

Some sources state that Bahrumsyah left for Syria after this incident, with funds coming from Chep Hernawan, an Indonesian business tycoon with radical beliefs. Chep had been described as “president of IS in Indonesia” by Abu Bakar Bashir.

In 1998, Chep had founded the Islamic Reformist Movement or Garis, with the aim of transforming Indonesia into an “Islamic State”. Chep admitted that he had funded Bahrumsyah’s trip to Syria along with that of more than 150 other jihadists who came mostly from West Java.

Chep added that the jihadists he funded were mostly supporters of Garis. In March last year, he stated that he was in regular communication with Bahrumsyah, who by this time had emerged as the leader of the South-east Asian jihadists supporting IS in Syria and Iraq (Pratama and Armandhanu 2015).

BAHRUMSYAH AS EMIR OF KATIBAH NUSANTARA

Bahrumsyah’s reasons for undertaking violent jihadi operations in Syria and Iraq stemmed from two key factors that will be discussed below. These factors influenced him and largely shaped the thoughts and belief systems of other Indonesian jihadists in Iraq and Syria. The number of these jihadists is estimated at 1,000, with many travelling along with their families and children.

The first factor was domestic in nature. According to Chep, Indonesian jihadists reached a consensus in December 2011 during a meeting in Cianjur, West Java, that they would not undertake armed or violent jihad in Indonesia for the time being. This was due to the counterproductive effects of JI’s militant activities, which led to many Indonesian casualties and the decimation of the bulk of JI jihadi leadership by the police.

While this was agreed upon by the senior jihadists, the junior jihadists were unhappy with the consensus as they wanted to take action against the Indonesian government and its supporters whom they viewed as thaghut (transgressors) who should be killed.

In Chep’s words: “… as there was this commitment not to undertake violence in Indonesia and I feared that these young jihadists may undertake violence, I decided to send them there (Syria and Iraq)”.

The second factor was the perception that it was the right time to undertake jihad in Syria and Iraq in the name of Dawlah Islamiyah, led by the “caliph”, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. Overall, the struggle to establish an Islamic caliphate was viewed as defensive jihad to safeguard the Islamic faith and Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.

This perception arose following the United States-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 and later, the transfer of power to the Iraqi Shias in 2004. These developments contributed to the persecution and killing of Iraqi Sunnis in large numbers, partly in revenge for Saddam Hussein’s actions and his broad repression of the Iraqi Shia majority.

After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, fighting the Shias became a priority for IS, as Sunni Muslims were believed to be oppressed and discriminated against. These acuities gained traction in Indonesia and led to some Indonesian radicals going to Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of IS. These factors are likely to have played a key role in Bahrumsyah’s migration to Syria.

REGIONAL COMMANDER

Bahrumsyah was appointed emir of Katibah Nusantara by al-Baghdadi. This unit was formed in Hasakah in Syria and has been involved in various combat operations, military training, handling of sophisticated weapons, manufacturing of improvised explosive devices, sniping and ideological propagation. He is also involved in IS-related propaganda and recruitment, calling on Indonesians to join IS. He has been featured in three IS propaganda videos, the first of which was released in August 2014, followed shortly afterwards by two others.

One of these videos showed young boys undergoing military training and indoctrination and another showed Bahrumsyah in military fatigues, giving instructions to armed jihadists. Katibah Nusantara also focuses on demonstrating that South-east Asia, with one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in the world, is in support of IS. Certain reports last year had wrongly claimed that Bahrumsyah had died. There have also been claims of splits in Katibah Nusantara, with leadership challenges being mounted by other Indonesian jihadists, such as Abu Jandal (recently reported to have died) and Bahrun Naim.

However, these too are unfounded and his appointment as emir by al-Baghdadi has not changed. Indonesian IS supporters, especially those based in Bekasi, have confirmed that Bahrumsyah is alive and in command of Katibah Nusantara despite the aerial attacks by Russian and Syrian air forces. The airstrikes have forced many of Katibah Nusantara fighters to seek refuge in various parts of IS-held territories. As many of them are located in Mosul, the current military operation in Mosul could affect the future of Katibah Nusantara in a similar manner as the battle for control of Aleppo and Raqqa. Any adverse impact on the future of Katibah Nusantara will affect Bahrumsyah’s leadership.

BATTLE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Should IS be routed in Iraq and Syria, there is a high possibility that many of the Indonesian fighters would return to Indonesia or the southern Philippines. More than 300 Indonesian fighters are believed to have already done so. This would have serious security implications for Indonesia and the region as these are battled-hardened and experienced fighters, ideologically fortified, and adept in networking.

The threat would be heightened if charismatic and “al-Baghdadi-appointed” commanders such as Bahrumsyah take charge of the jihadi struggle in South-east Asia. The possibility of Bahrumsyah and Isnilon Hapilon, the emir of IS Philippines, working together will also determine the threat level in South-east Asia. As the return of foreign fighters would be a game changer in respect of the terrorism threat in the region, governments in South-east Asia, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, would have to prevent returnees such as Bahrumsyah from exploiting the situation and pushing the violent jihadi cause in South-east Asia.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Jasminder Singh is a senior analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. This piece first appeared in the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis journal published by ICPVTR.